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CAPITAL MARKETS, AND 
SECURITIES LAW 
ADAM C. PRITCHARD 
1 INTRODUCTION 
·················· .. ················ .. ·····•·· ...................................................................................................................................... . 
AT first blush, the connection between corporate governance and capital markets might 
seem tenuous. Under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH),1 investors will in-
corporate their assessment of a firm's corporate governance into their valuation of the firm's 
future cash flows and the risk associated with those cash flows. Consequently, a company's 
stock price will reflect the quality of its corporate governance in limiting agency costs as-
sociated with the company's managers and/or controlling shareholders.2 On this view, 
securities regulators' only concern is ensuring that corporate governance terms are accu-
rately disclosed. If disclosure is effective, even unsophisticated investors will be protected. 
Poor corporate governance-if it is adequately disclosed-will not affect investors' expected 
returns because the price they pay for a security will be "fair:' i.e., discounted to reflect any 
reduced returns that may result from poor corporate governance. 1hus, one can think of se-
curities markets as a grading mechanism for the efficacy of corporate governance. 
From its beginnings, however, securities law has sought to do more than neutrally grade 
corporate governance. Securities law obviously needs to discourage fraud, with its ob-
vious implications for the value of disclosure. (Fraud also has the potential to undermine 
the market's ability to grade firms' corporate governance provisions.) But securities law 
has also worried about other forms of overreaching by corporate insiders. Justice Louis 
Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase that "s[]unlight ... is the best disinfectant; electric light the best 
1 See Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", 25 J. Fin. 
383 (1970) (surveying theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical testing of the efficient 
markets hypothesis). 
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, "The Corporate Contract", 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 
1432 (1989) ("Governance structures are known to anyone seeking the information, so the pricing 
mechanism will embody their effects for good or ill"). 
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policeman" captures the attitude succinctly.3 Disclosure has been justified, not simply as a 
means of promoting accurate pricing, but also as a means of exposing-and disinfecting-
problematic behavior. Exposure would deter wrongdoing by managers and promoters. 4 
Managers bent on self-dealing may restrain themselves if related-party transactions must 
be disclosed, at least if disclosure is backed by a plausible threat of enforcement. If investors 
(and perhaps, regulators) can see such activities dearly, then market participants (assuming 
either a modicum of shame or oversight) are less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior 
in the first place. 5 
What role should securities law play in encouraging corporate governance standards that 
hold managers and directors accountable to shareholders? Is disclosure, bolstered by market 
forces, sufficient to induce efficient corporate governance provisions, as the ECMH suggests? 
Or should securities law affirmatively seek to put a thumb on the scale of corporate govern-
ance outcomes, pushing companies toward "'good" corporate governance? From the per-
spective of those who believe that governance has significant potential to limit agency costs, 
a disclosure regime-coupled with robust enforcement-that promoted good corporate 
governance might provide a signal that a company was well run, with structural provisions 
in place ( e.g., independent directors) to keep agency costs in check. If investors value that 
signal, we have the groundwork for a virtuous circle, with an efficient and effective disclosure 
regime fueling a potential race to the top in corporate governance. 
This argument blurs the line between corporate governance and the disclosure focus of se-
curities law. But another question lurks: Does corporate governance influence the efficiency 
of securities markets? History suggests it might Exchanges have long imposed corporate 
governance mandates on companies listing their shares for trading. Securities regulators, as 
they have gained greater authority over exchanges, have used listing standards as a tool for 
promoting more stringent corporate governance standards in the name of promoting "'in-
vestor confidence," and at least implicitly, liquidity. 
There may be limits, however, to the connection between liquidity and corporate govern-
ance. In the US, listing standards for public companies have become a favored tool by which 
the federal government imposes governance standards. Those standards, however, do not 
always have a clear connection to the efficiency of securities markets. Consequently, it is un-
clear whether the US model of securities law provides a useful lesson, or a cautionary tale, for 
other jurisdictions contemplating corporate governance reform. 
This chapter explores the dividing line between corporate governance and securities law 
from both historical and institutional perspectives. Section 2 examines the origins of the di-
viding line between securities law and corporate governance in the United States, as well as 
the efforts of the SEC to push against that boundary. That history sets the stage for section 
3, which broadens the inquiry by examining the institutional connections between capital 
markets and corporate governance. Are there practical limits to the connection between 
3 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money 92 (1913). 
4 'Iroy A. Paredes, "Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation", 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417,464 (2003) ("Toe strategy of shaming is premised on actively using 
disclosure to influence corporate conduct"). 
5 See Paul G. Mahoney, "Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems", 62 U. Chi 
L. Rev. 1047 (1995) (contending that mandatory disclosure works to deter managers from engaging in 
opportunistic behavior at the expense of shareholders). 
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securities law and corporate governance? The US again illustrates the point, as Congress has 
increasingly crossed the traditional boundary between securities law and corporate govern-
ance. I conclude by speculating on the future of the dividing line between corporate govern-
ance and securities law. 
2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DIVIDING LINE 
BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
THE SECURITIES LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
2.1 Corporate Law and Corporate Governance in 
the United States 
The US treats corporate governance and securities law as separate spheres. Why not just 
"company law»? The answer is historical, not functional. Before there were federal securities 
laws in the US, there were state corporate laws. State corporate law not only gave corporations 
their legal existence, but also imposed corporate governance mandates for the protection 
of shareholders and creditors. State corporate law determines most questions of internal 
corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between 
directors, managers, and shareholders, etc. 6 'Ihe force of those mandates is constrained by 
the fact that, under US law, companies have unfettered discretion in choosing their state of 
incorporation. Moreover, the "internal affairs" doctrine requires courts to apply the law of 
the state of incorporation to corporate law disputes. 7 
The result of this combination has been an "issuer choice» regime in state corporate law 
in that US Corporations are free to choose the law of the state that best suits the needs of 
their directors, managers, and shareholders, without regard to where the corporation prin-
cipally does business. States can compete to attract firms by offering the most attractive 
menu of corporate law rules and the best judges for resolving any disputes that may arise. 
Directors make that choice, subject to the risk that the market will sanction them if they pick 
a jurisdiction with overly lax standards. Thus, the stage was set early on for an "enabling" or 
"permissive" model of state corporate law, which progressively diluted a number of the regu-
latory mandates that were common in early state corporation statutes. First New Jersey, then 
Delaware, took the lead in attracting corporations headquartered in other jurisdictions, with 
the principal selling point being the elimination of restrictions on corporate directors and 
managers that earlier featured prominently in the corporate law of many states. 8 Defenders 
6 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their 
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires 
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state will govern the internal affairs of 
the corporation"). 
7 On the history of the internal affairs doctrine, see Frederick Tung, "Before Competition: Origins of 
the Internal Affairs Doctrine", 32 J. Corp. L. 33 (2006). 
8 Curtis Alva, "Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency~ 15 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 885,898 (1990). 
1066 ADAM C. PRITCHARD 
of this trend contend that competition in the capital markets compels managers to offer 
shareholders corporate law rules that effectively constrain the agency costs inherent in the 
separation of ownership and control.9 
Even before the adoption of the federal securities laws, there were counterweights to the 
influence of the states over corporate governance, primarily driven by capital markets. That 
market-driven response suggests there may be an inherent connection between corporate 
governance and capital markets. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-the first truly na-
tional exchange in the US-provided a contractual version of a national securities law, at 
least for the US's largest public companies. Through its listing agreement, the NYSE played 
an important role in promoting both disclosure and improved corporate governance by 
allowing companies to pre-commit to best practices. Most conspicuously, the NYSE waged a 
long campaign against the traditional secrecy of corporate managers.10 Despite a number of 
practical obstacles, 11 the NYSE eventually was able to require listed corporations to provide 
regular balance sheets and other financial data to stockholders.12 The NYSE's requirement 
that those financial statements be audited also provided a substantial impediment to fraud.13 
The NYSE's practice of imposing corporate governance and disclosure requirements 
through listing standards, although purely voluntary (no one could force a company to list 
its shares), did create a contractual certification mechanism that companies could use to 
signal their quality. The value of the NYSE's listing requirements is testified by the fact that 
Congress closely tracked the NYSE disclosure requirements when it drafted the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).14 The difference, of course, is that the disclosure 
requirements for public companies became a legal mandate, backed up by SEC enforce-
ment, rather than a contractual undertaking, backed up by the threat of delisting from the 
exchange. With the advent of that mandate, the stage was set for the dividing line between 
corporate governance and securities law to have significant consequences because securities 
law, unlike state corporate law or listing standards, c~uld not be easily evaded. 
9 Ralph K. Wmter, "State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation': 6 J. Leg. 
Stud. 251 (1977). 
10 George 1. Leffler, TheStockMarket428-29 (1951). 
11 The movement toward requiring greater disclosure by listing companies was prolonged by the fact 
that changes in listing agreements do not work retroactively. Leffler, supra note 10, at 433 ("Companies 
could be held only to agreements which they had signed; some of these were entered into a great many 
years ago. If new and additional agreements were formulated by the Exchange, old listed companies 
could not be compelled to comply except by Exchange persuasion, or if they applied for further listing 
of stock"); Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal 40 (1970) ("Recommendations 
by the listing committee were never retroactive"). Until 1939, companies paid a one-time listing fee 
which gave them the right to a listing in perpetuity. Leffler, supra note 10, at 427. Finally, other exchanges 
imposed substantially lower listing standards than did the NYSE, and the over-the-counter market 
imposed none at all. Leffler, supra note 10, at 433. The combination of these factors undoubtedly reduced 
the NYSE's bargaining leverage with companies in pushing for greater disclosure. More fundamentally, it 
also suggests that the demand for disclosure among investors was limited. 
12 Paul G. Mahoney, "The Exchange as Regulator': 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1469-70 (1997). 
13 The policy was adopted in 1928; by 1931, 83% oflisted companies were complying, and in 1932 
the NYSE made the policy mandatory for all newly listed companies. See Leffler, supra note 10, at 430 
( discussing NYSE's struggle to force companies to submit to·independent audits). 
14 George J. Benston, "Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934': 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132., 133 (1973). 
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2.2 The Introduction of the Federal Securities Laws 
The gradual relaxation of corporate governance mandates in state corporate law was not 
without its detractors, then or now. Critics of issuer choice argue that states were competing 
for charter fees-soliciting "tramp" corporations-by pandering to corporate managers. The 
incentive for the states to compete for charters is clear. Delaware, as the long-term winner 
of that competition for corporate charters, 15 currently funds roughly a quarter of its state 
budget from corporate charter fees.16 Critics of issuer choice charge that states prevail in this 
competition by leaving shareholders vulnerable to overreaching by corporate managers. 
Exchange listing requirements are an insufficient counterweight, on this view, because 
exchanges are similarly beholden to corporate managers. The result, critics alleged, has been 
a "race to the bottom:'17 
The obvious answer to concerns raised by a potential "race to the bottom'' was federal min-
imum standards, but at one time, the federal structure of the US government was thought to 
limit the federal government's power over corporate governance. As the US confronted the 
economic devastation wrought by the stock market crash of October 1929 and the ensuing 
Great Depression, corporate governance was seen as the province of the states, whose 
corporate laws gave corporations their very existence. Thus, the scope of the federal inter-
vention was necessarily constrained, the policy levers available were limited. 
There was some support among more radical New Deal reformers for a "federal corporate 
law." The interventions that Franklin Delano Roosevelt would ultimately pursue were more 
targeted, however, as his administration was reluctant to push constitutional limits. As we 
shall see, those limits were soon abandoned. By the end of the Second World War, the con-
stitution was no longer a meaningful constraint on the power of the federal government to 
dictate corporate governance standards. The dividing line fostered by those now-discarded 
constitutional doubts, however, persists in the US as a matter of tradition and interpre-
tive presumption. Even today, state corporate law determines most internal governance 
questions while federal securities law is generally limited to governing questions of disclos-
ure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. 
The push to enact federal securities law was one of the great political battlegrounds of 
the New Deal; 1933 to 1935 saw annual fights to enact the three laws that established the 
foundation of federal securities legislation. The first, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act), brought the federal government into the regulation of the public offering of secur-
ities, curbing the investment bankers' prior domination of that process. The law required 
corporate issuers to make full disclosure when selling securities. The second, the Exchange 
Act, required disclosure of operations and results by companies listing on exchanges, as 
noted above. Although the Exchange Act targeted the NYSE, particularly in regulating 
broker-dealers, the NYSE did get one benefit from the law: The Exchange Act's mandate 
15 According to the Delaware Secretary of State, 83% of U.S. IPOs in 2013 were incorporated in 
Delaware, along with more than half of all public companies and 65% of the Fortune 500. Delaware is 
the Jurisdiction of Choice for U.S. IPOs, Delaware Corporate and Legal Services Blog (June 2, 2014), 
available at http:/ /decals.delaware.gov/2014/06/0:2/delaware-is-the-jurisdiction-of-choice-for-u-s-ipos/. 
16 Delaware Division of Corporations, 2012 Annual Report, at 2 (reporting that division collected 
"$867-2 million dollars in fiscal year (FY) :2012 and accounted for 26% of the State's general fund"). 
17 William Cary, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware", 83 Yale L. J. 663 (1974). 
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for disclosure by listed companies eliminated the ability of rival exchanges to undercut the 
NYSE's disclosure requirements. The NYSE's gold-plated standards would be mandated 
for all listed companies, although companies that traded in the over-the-counter market 
remained exempt for another 30 years. These two laws cemented disclosure as the founda-
tional basis of the securities law. 
The third foundational securities law, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(PUHCA), departed from the disclosure model underpinning the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act, making it the most controversial of the three securities laws from FDR's first 
term.18 PUHCA targeted the holding companies that owned most of the public utilities in 
the US at the time. The public utility structure had long been a bete noire of reformers; the 
collapse of the Insull public utility holding company was the Enron of its day.19 lhe demise 
of the Insull empire cemented the public utility holding company structure's reputation 
for abuse. 
Given that the holding companies sprawled across multiple jurisdictions, no state could 
effectively control their corporate governance. Disclosure was not enough to correct the 
abuses. If regulatory oversight of these monopolies was to be effective, stronger medicine 
was required: The federal government needed to control corporate governance. The eco-
nomic crisis provided Roosevelt with the opportunity to eliminate the holding companies. 
On January 4, 1935, Roosevelt called for the "abolition of the evil of holding companies" in his 
State of the Union address to Congress. 20 The public utilities industry was considerably less 
enthusiastic about being the subject of the federal government's experiments in corporate 
governance, predicting economic disaster if the bill were enacted. 21 
PUHCA went well beyond the disclosure mandates of the two earlier securities statutes. 
PUHCA'.s "death sentence" provision effectively limited utility holding companies to one 
geographic area; those that did not comply were to be broken up under the direction of the 
SEC.22 The death sentence provision was a major departure from the disclosure paradigm 
18 Joel Seligman has characterized PUHCA as "the most radical reform measure of the Roosevelt 
administration:' Joel Seligman, The Thansformation of Wall Street 122 (3d ed. 2003); see also Morris 
L. Porer, "A Postsaipt to the Administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act: The Hydro-
Electric System Case': 45 Va. L. Rev. 1007, 1007-08 (1959) ("Probably the most dynamic piece of New 
Deal legislation, [PUHCA] was revolutionary in that it required not only the immediate eradication of 
specific and now all too familiar abuses, but also in that it provided for the minute supervision of actions 
and programs then conceived as being safely reposed in management This statute aimed not only at the 
remedial, but, shooting at the escaping present, had also as its target a better economic future'" (footnote 
omitted)). 
19 See David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America 
and Where They Came From 8, 80-89 (2005) ( discussing Insull); Richard D. Cudahy & William 
D. Henderson, "From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise And Fall ofTwo Energy 
Icons': 2.6 Energy L. J. 35, 36 (2005). 
20 Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Age of Roosevelt: 1935-1936': The Politics of Upheaval 
305 (1960). 
21 Wendell Wtllkie, the president of Commonwealth and Southern (and future Republican 
presidential nominee), warned that: "the utility industry would be thrown "into a chaos ofliquidation 
and receiverships; holders of utility stocks would suffer "practically complete" losses, and a "great 
bureaucracy in Washington will be regulating the internal aJfairs of practically all utility operating 
companies in the United States.'.' The backers of the death sentence, Willkie charged, were trying "to 
'nationali.7.e' the power business of this country." Id. at 310. 
22 Seligman, supra note 18, at 131. 
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of the earlier securities laws. The holding company legislation also required registration 
and disclosure, but it broke new ground in giving the SEC control over the utilities' capital 
structures and corporate governance as part of their reorganization. Thus, the legislation set 
a new high water mark for federal interference with business: "Except in wartime, the fed-
eral government never before had assumed such total control over any industry."23 PUHCA's 
sweeping reforms would trigger a decade-long war in the courts, as the giant utilities resisted 
the efforts of the SEC to dismantle them. But it also set the stage for the SEC to play a key role 
in corporate governance, albeit for only a portion of American business. 
For opponents of federal economic regulation, PUHCA looked like the constitutional 
test case for the federal control of corporate governance that liberals had long sought. The 
Roosevelt administration ultimately prevailed despite the industry's resistance, but only 
after an epic legal struggle, requiring three visits to the Supreme Court before it was finally 
resolved in the government's favor.24 Only a decade after PUHC& enactment did the Court 
resolve the constitutionality of the controversial death sentence provision.25 When the North 
American v. SEC decision came down, it was an enthusiastic validation of the SEC's power 
to break up utility holding companies. The Court's opinion painted with a broad, moral-
istic brush: "The fact that an evil may involve a corporation's financial practices, its business 
structure or its security portfolio does not detract from the power of Congress under the 
commerce clause to promulgate rules in order to destroy that evil."26 Under its new under-
standing of the Commerce Clause, the Court had validated the federal government's au-
thority over corporate governance. Would Congress and the SEC exercise that authority? 
The answer was no-at least in the short term. Having gained the power, the federal 
government lost the will. PUHCA, which in the 1940s allowed the SEC to dictate corpor-
ate governance standards to an industry vital to the economy, faded in significance after 
the nation's public utility holding companies were broken up by the 1950s. It did not prove 
to be the trial run for "federal corporation law" as liberals had hoped. A generation later, 
narrow interpretations and regulatory exemptions undid much of the work accomplished 
by the SEC in breaking up the holding companies. New utility conglomerates emerged, such 
as Enron, with diverse business interests and sprawling operations. PUHCA's purpose was 
largely repudiated, and the Act itself was repealed in 2005. 27 After PUHCA's repeal, the SEC 
was deprived of the role that gave the agency an important say in corporate governance, lim-
iting the agency to overseeing the disclosure-focused regulation of the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act. 
PUHC& withering foreshadowed a broader retreat by Congress and the SEC in the realm 
of corporate governance, and indeed, securities law generally. Congress passed no signifi-
cant securities legislation between 1940 and 1964. The SEC went from being an activist force 
in the 1930s, to being a backwater after its wartinle move to Philadelphia. (It was not returned 
23 Schlesinger, supra note 20, at 306. 
24 The Court first addressed whether a host of individual challenges to the statute could be stayed 
pending Supreme Court consideration of a test case. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 249 
(1936). The second case upheld only the constitutionality of the relatively uncontroversial registration 
and disclosure provisions of PUHCA. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 442-443 (1938). 
25 See N. Am. Co v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946). 
26 Id at 706. Murphy similarly disposed of the due process clause claim. Id at 708. 
27 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-158, 119 Stat. 594, 
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from exile until 1948.) Simply put, almost as soon as the constitutionality of PUHCA was es-
tablished in North American, affirming the power of Congress over corporate governance, 
securities law stopped pushing those boundaries. Not until the 1960s would that push be 
revived, but that extension would come from the SEC and the courts, not Congress. 
2.3 The 1960s Expansion 
The 1960s witnessed a rapid expansion of the influence of the federal securities laws, in the 
form of broad interpretations of Rule 1ob-5 of the Exchange Act.28 Rule 1ob-5, which the 
Commission had adopted two decades earlier under its§ 1o(b) authority as a general anti-
fraud prohibition, threatened to become an overarching "federal corporation law:'29 
The development began with a topic squarely at the intersection of disclosure and cor-
porate governance: insider trading. Informational advantages discourage stock market 
liquidity, so exchanges and securities regulators have an incentive to check information 
asymmetry if it is feasible to do so. For that reason, the NYSE and other exchanges have long 
had (spottily enforced) requirements that listed companies disclose information that was 
likely to move the market. The intersection with corporate governance arises because use 
of inside information can be thought of as a misappropriation by the insider of a corporate 
asset: material, confidential business information. That misappropriation has come to be 
seen as a breach of fiduciary duty under state corporate law. 30 The influence of inside infor-
mation on the securities markets has also attracted the interest of the SEC, however, and that 
agency has played the starring role in developing the law of insider trading. 
The SEC's first salvo came in 1961, when it pioneered prohibitions against insider trading 
with its Cady, Roberts decision.31 The source of the prohibition was somewhat surprising. 
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission interpreted Rule 1ob-5 to prohibit insider trading, de-
spite the fact that neither Rule 1ob-5 nor § 1o(b) makes any mention of insider trading. 
Notwithstanding this omission, the SEC found in Cady, Roberts that a director of a public 
company violated Rule 1ob-5 by tipping non-public information. The director had learned 
that the company was planning to cut the size ofits dividend. The director, who happened to 
be the partner of a brokerage firm, provided the information to one of his partners at the bro-
kerage house, who traded on it. In concluding that the director had violated Rule 1ob-5, the 
SEC set out a broad fiduciary standard for the insider trading prohibition: 
The obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving 
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate pur-
pose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved 
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with 
whom he is dealing.32 
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (2002). 
29 See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr.," 'Federal Corporation Law': An Assessment~ 78 Harv. L. Rev. 
1ut6 (1965) (arguing that "the growth of federal law in the corporate area is sound," but noting the 
criticism "that federal law has invaded areas never contemplated by the Congress when adopting the 
securities acts"). 
30 Brophy v. Cities Services Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A2d 5 (1949). 
31 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912-913 (1961). 32 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). 
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This standard was not constrained by state law notions of fiduciary duty. Indeed, Cady, 
Roberts noted in passing that "the securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new 
and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law:'33 
The SEC's interpretation is breathtaking in its assertiveness. The fiduciary obligation 
outlined by the agency finds no support in the text of either Rule 1ob-5 or§ 1o(b). With the 
Cady, Roberts decision, the SEC gave notice that in interpreting " [the] elements [of§ 1o(b)] 
under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by 
fine distinctions and rigid classifications:'34 Thus, the SEC announced its intent to root out 
information asymmetries in the secondary markets to protect "the buying public" "from 
the misuse of special information:'35 The securities laws would be interpreted as needed to 
achieve that goal; the SEC developing its own body of fiduciary principles, unmoored from 
statutory text and untethered by state corporate law, to achieve that end. 36 
Three years later in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court gave a green light to the SEC to extend the boundaries 
of its powers in fleshing out a new-federal-understanding of fiduciary obligation. The 
Capital Gains decision, although turning on an interpretation of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940,38 suggested that the SEC could expand its power through agency and judi-
cial interpretation of existing statutes and regulation. The agency would not need to re-
sort to the cumbersome rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
or, still more daunting, seek legislation. According to the Court, "Congress intended the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation enacted 
for the purpose of avoiding frauds, not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes:'39 After its victory in Capital Gains, the SEC would push an 
aggressive interpretation of§ 1o(b) of the Exchange Act in the lower courts, particularly the 
Second Circuit, as its principal weapon in its bold new campaign against insider trading. 
Four years later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit would validate the SEC's 
expansive reading of§ 1o(b) of the Exchange Act.4° Capital Gains would be cited by the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur majority for the proposition that even negligent insider trading would 
be unlawful.41 Post Capital Gains, the SEC and the lower courts could feel confident that 
their expansive interpretations would be upheld. 
By the end of the 1960s the federal securities laws seemed poised to take over the law 
governing corporations entirely. In the words of Louis Loss, "the great Rule 1ob-5 ... seems 
to be taking over the universe gradually:'42 This usurpation of corporate governance 
standards was being accomplished by the SEC and the courts without any intervention 
from Congress. 
33 Id at 910 (footnote omitted). 34 Id. at 912. 35 Id. at 913. 
36 David S. Ruder, "Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication 
Through Rule 1ob-5", 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 185,185 (1964) ("Despite Congressional unwillingness to 
enact a 'federal law of corporations: it now appears that such a law is arising by implication through 
interpretation of the various securities acts"). 
37 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 38 54 Stat. 847, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 8ob-1 et seq. 
39 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (citations and quotations omitted). 
40 401 Rzd 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane). 41 Id. at 855. 
42 Louis L. Loss, "The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project': 25 Bus. Law. 27, 34 
(1969). 
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2.4 The 1970s and 1980s: Retrenchment 
The era of 1ob-5 expansionism came to an abrupt halt in the 1970s. The first salvo came in 
a pair of class actions from the mid-197os-Blue Chip Stamps43 and Ernst & Ernst44- in 
which the Supreme Court made plain its intention to rein in Rule 1ob-5. Blue Chi'p Stamps 
holds that a private plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to state a claim under 
Rule 1ob-5, 45 but the opinion is notable for its skepticism regarding securities fraud class 
actions, which were the lawsuits affording the Second Circuit the opportunity to push the 
boundaries of Rule 1ob-5.46 Ernst & Ernst signals a reading of Rule 1ob-5 narrowly tethered 
to the text of§ 1o(b ). In rejecting the argument that an allegation of negligence would es-
tablish a fraud claim under Rule 1ob-5, the Court emphasized that the scope of Rule 1ob-
5 "cannot exceed the power granted the [SEC] by Congress under§ io(b)."47 Blue Chip and 
Ernst & Ernst signaled that the Supreme Court had abandoned "flexible" construction of the 
sort seen in Cady, Roberts and Capital Gains to achieve "remedial purposes." 
The nail in the coffin for the effort to push Rule 1ob-5 into the realm of corporate gov-
ernance arrived soon thereafter. Santa Fe Industries v. Green48 is the Court's most sweeping 
defense of state corporate law. The Second Circuit held that a short form merger authorized 
by Delaware law,49 which "froze out" the company's minority shareholders, violated Rule 
1ob-5.50 'Ihat court held that "no allegation or proof of misrepresentation or nondisclosure 
[was] necessary'' to state a violation of Rule 1ob-5; a breach of fiduciary duty was sufficient. 51 
Rule 1ob-5 was completely divorced from disclosure. Moreover, that breach of fiduciary duty 
arose out of federal, rather than state, common law.52 
In reversing the Second Circuit, Justice Byron White held for the Court that fraud requires 
a misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 53 That was sufficient to answer the question presented, 
but White went out of his way to defend the role of state corporate law: 
1he reasoning behind a holding that the complaint in this case alleged fraud under Rule 
1ob-s could not be easily contained ... 1he result would be to bring within the Rule a wide 
variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation ... this extension of the 
federal securities laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law. 
Federal courts applying a "federal fiduciary principle" under Rule 1ob-5 could be expected 
to depart from state fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity 
within the federal system. Absent a dear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant 
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions 
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden. 54 
43 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
44 Ernst & Ernstv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 45 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754-755. 
46 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739 ("litigation under Rule 1ob-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different 
in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general" and the risk that the threat of 
enormous discovery costs could produce" 'in terrorem' settlements"). 
47 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214. 48 430 U.S. 462 (1977 ). 
49 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). 
50 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1976). 51 Id. at 1287. 
52 Id. at 1286. 53 Santa Felndus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-474 (1977). 
54 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478-479 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Thus, the Supreme Court was emphatic in drawing a line in the sand to preserve state corpor-
ate law from lower federal courts developing their own "federal corporate law:' 
A decade later, the Court did not hesitate to reaffirm the line between state corporate law 
and federal securities law when a wave of hostile takeovers reached its zenith in the 1980s.55 
The states were taking the lead in discouraging takeovers. The SEC was in the opposing 
corner, attempting to use federal law to head off state efforts to restrict the market for corpor-
ate control. 56 Once again, the Supreme Court came down firmly on the side of states' control 
over corporate governance. 
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 the Indiana anti-takeover statute at issue re-
quired a potential acquirer ( defined as anyone acquiring certain threshold percentages of the 
company's shares) to obtain the approval of a company's "disinterested" shares (defined as 
shares not owned by the acquirer or management) before it would be allowed to vote its own 
shares.58 Tous, a hostile tender offeror could not use its voting power to remove incumbent 
management without the approval of the company's independent shareholders. The Indiana 
statute was limited to corporations organized under the law of Indiana, with their principal 
place of business and a substantial shareholder presence in that state.59 
In upholding the statute against twin challenges based on the Dormant Commerce Clause 
and preemption under the federal securities law, the Court emphasized that state authority 
over voting rights was supported by tradition: "No principle of corporation law and practice 
is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corps, including the 
voting rights of shareholders."60 By implication, the SEC's authority in this area was doubtful 
absent explicit legislative authorization. 61 As far as the Supreme Court was concerned, cor-
porate governance was a topic for the states, not the SEC. 
In some tension with these decisions rebuffing "federal corporate law" is the Supreme 
Court's insider trading decision in Chiarella v. United States.62 Justice Lewis Powell, writing 
for the Court, construed Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny in the 
Second Circuit narrowly, fitting those decisions into a common law framework, but that 
55 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings 44-49 (3d ed. 2002) 
(collecting statistics on the incidence of hostile takeovers). 
56 Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong. (1984) (proposing, at the SEC's urging, that 
the Williams Act be expanded to give the SEC jurisdiction over anti-takeover devices). 
57 481 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1987). 58 Id. 
59 Ind. Code§ 23-1-42-4(a) (1986), quoted in CTS, 481 U.S. at 72-73, 6° CTS, 481 U.S. at 89. 
61 The limits on the SEC's authority over corporate governance were reinforced by D.C. Circuit's 
resolution of the conflict over dual-class voting stock. For over fifty years the NYSE prohibited listed 
companies from issuing common stock without voting rights. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, "The Short Life 
and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4': 69 Wash. U. L. Q. 565,569 (1991) (discussing origins ofNYSE rule 
against non-voting common). The Nasdaq did not impose similar restrictions in its listing agreement. Id 
at 575. In the 1980s General Motors, an NYSE company, refused to comply with the rule prohibiting non-
voting common stock, and the NYSE essentially ignored GM's defiance of the rule. Id. at 576-77 & n. 54. 
The NYSE was unwilling to enforce its rule unless the AMEX and Nasdaq prohibited the practice as well. 
Daniel R. Fischel, "Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock': 54 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 119,121 (1987). The SEC responded by adopting a rule ofits own prohibiting non-voting common 
stock. That rule was struck down by the D.C. Circuit as beyond the Commission's statutory authority. 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 fad 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990 ). Subsequently, the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq 
agreed upon a rule limiting non-voting common stock. See "SEC Approves New Voting Rights Rule, 
Adopts Rule Streamlining SRO Regulation~ 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1708 (Dec. 23, 1994). 
62 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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framework rested on a federal common law. 63 Powell rejected a duty to the sellers because 
Chiarella owed them no fiduciary duty.64 The common law of fraud required a duty to the 
person on the other side of the transaction.65 Despite his reliance on common law princi-
ples, Powell was creating a federal fiduciary principle, not incorporating state law into fed-
eral law. Consequently, Chiarella's approach is hard to square with Justice White's rejection 
of a federal fiduciary standard in Santa Fe. Powell's justification for relying on fiduciary duty? 
"Section 1o(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud"66 
Powell recognized that insider trading law would have implications for corporate govern-
ance, but he wanted to keep that body of law firmly rooted in disclosure, the province of 
federal law. Fiduciary duty provided him the doctrinal tool to confine insider trading to 
(somewhat) traditional notions of fraud 
3 CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
3.1 An International Market for Corporate Governance? 
We have seen the US market for corporate charters protected by the Supreme Court from 
incursions by the SEC. That market now has an international analogue. Capital markets are 
no longer parochial; technological changes have made the market for listings much deeper. 
Improvements in communication and related technologies have created an international 
market for stock exchange listings that resembles, in many respects, the longstanding/ederal 
market for corporate charters in the US. 
Historically, issuers listed their stock for trading on one of the exchanges in the country 
where they principally did business. In an era when businesses are consolidating across na-
tional boundaries to create international conglomerates, the notion of a corporation having 
a "home" country seems increasingly archaic. Corporations, at least those of a certain size, 
are now citizens of the world, although they may identify for a time with the jurisdiction 
where their headquarters are located. Today, corporations around the world realistically 
can choose the location, or locations, where they want to raise capital. They can also choose 
where they want their common shares to trade. Corporations are not limited to their "home" 
country for financing and trading, and the capital-raising decision need not be linked to the 
listing decision. 
Why not, then, list on an exchange that allowed a company to signal the quality of its cor-
porate governance? There are obvious efficiency advantages. Disclosure of corporate gov-
ernance terms will not only facilitate more accurate securities prices, but also allow investors 
to make better choices in allocating their investment dollars, funneling capital to better 
managed companies. If firms do not give credible assurances that they will not abuse their 
investors' trust, investors will not entrust them with their investment dollars. Companies 
63 A.C. Pritchard, "United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of 
Insider Trading': 78B.U. L Rev.13 (1998). 
64 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232,-233. 65 Id. at 228. 66 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-235. 
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looking to maximize their returns when selling securities to the public will accordingly have 
a strong incentive to include corporate governance mechanisms valued by shareholders. 
Exchanges have market incentives to promote the signal: "Self-interested stock exchange 
members will produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested 
bakers produce the kind of bread that consumers want."67 Securities markets live or die with 
trading volume. Broker-dealers make a substantial portion of their revenues from trading 
commissions; another chunk comes from trading for their own accounts. More trading by 
customers obviously means more commissions, but more liquid markets also enhance the 
profitability of broker-dealers' own trading. Exchanges attract trading volume by encour-
aging companies to list their shares and by encouraging investors to trade in those listed 
shares. These two goals are largely consistent, as companies will want to list their shares on 
exchanges that provide the greatest liquidity because liquidity minimizes their cost of cap-
ital. The exchanges also have a quasi-property interest in the stock prices quoted in their 
market. This interest effectively makes the exchanges residual claimants in the integrity of 
those stock prices. Thus, exchanges might compete to attract trading volume by providing 
a "bonding'° signal to companies seeking to attract investors, if investors are more willing to 
trade in the stock of companies with good corporate governance. 
That story provides an optimistic scenario of corporate government and securities law 
complementing each other. What is the practical limit oflegislators and securities regulators 
to impose corporate governance mandates through securities laws? If capital markets pro-
vide the critical connection between the two, the answer to that question may lie with liq-
uidity. Greater disclosure of information is associated with higher levels of liquidity. 68 And 
there is evidence that fraud may have market-wide effects on liquidity.69 So exchanges, and 
perhaps, securities regulators, will have incentives to regulate in areas where the connection 
to liquidity is clear. 
Consider insider trading, one area where the SEC has had considerable success in im-
posing fiduciary standards on corporate insiders, with the blessing of both the Supreme 
Court and Congress. Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that insider trading 
harms liquidity.70 Insider traders hold information advantages over outsiders. Those infor-
mation asymmetries lead to trading profits-insiders buy low and sell high. To avoid the 
corresponding trading losses, outsiders would prefer to trade only with other outsiders. 
Securities markets are anonymous, however, so outsiders have no way of knowing when they 
are trading with an insider, but they do know that they will systematically lose when they do 
so. Market makers who supply liquidity to the markets on an uninformed basis will increase 
their spreads to reflect the possibility of dealing with an insider, converting insider trading 
into a transaction cost of all trading. Uninformed shareholders will discount the amount 
that they are willing to pay for shares by their expected losses from trading with insiders; 
67 Mahoney, supra note 12, at 1459. 
68 Frank L. Heflin et al., "Disclosure Policy and Market Liquidity: Impact of Depth Quotes and Order 
Sizes': 22 Contemporary Accounting Research 829 (2005). 
69 Panjak K. Jain et al., "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity': 43 Fin. Rev. 361-82 
(2008) (showing that market liquidity deteriorated following Enron and related scandals, and improved 
after the adoption ofSarbanes-Oxley). 
70 See, e.g., Louis Cheng et al., "The Effects of Insider Trading on Liquidity': 14 Pacific-Basin Fin. J. 467 
(2006). 
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they may attempt to avoid losses from trading with insiders by trading less frequently. Less 
trading means less liquidity, and less liquid securities markets raise the cost of trading. In 
this scenario, the SEC's effort to harness fiduciary principles in the service of promoting liq-
uidity deftly walks the line where corporate governance and securities law intersect. 
Policy makers recognize that encouraging liquid securities markets will facilitate cap-
ital formation, and thus, economic growth. Unfortunately, politicians are unlikely to worry 
about the details of promoting economic growth during a bull market. The capital markets 
are not crying out for government intervention when investors' primary focus is counting 
their gains. Bear markets, however, inevitably follow bull markets. Corporate mismanage-
ment and corruption can be obscured by rising stock prices, but the dirty laundry has a way 
of surfacing in bear markets. The bad news produces dissatisfied investors who clamor for 
government intervention, and politicians shake off their apathy and suddenly become pro-
foundly interested in securities law. This dynamic means that demands for regulation will 
arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills over into the real economy. Politicians 
will want to "do something~ even if the proposed something has scant connection to the 
promotion of liquid securities markets. Corporate governance may fit the bill, providing a 
salient response to the scandals arising during the crisis. 
3.2 The US Competes 
The recent history of securities regulation in the US illustrates the phenomenon. For a time, 
proponents of the US securities law regime argued that its rigor gave US exchanges a com-
petitive edge by allowing them to provide a bonding signal. Foreign companies could signal 
their integrity by exposing them.selves to the demands of the US disclosure and enforcement 
regime, which proponents claimed was the best in the world. 71 That regime permitted foreign 
companies to credibly pre-commit to limit self-dealing transactions, a concern that might be 
particularly salient in jurisdictions where controlling shareholders are common, i.e., most 
jurisdictions other than the US and the UK. Companies headquartered in jurisdictions not 
known for the quality of their legal systems might be particularly interested in the possibility 
of buying a credible "bonding" signal; it might be difficult or impossible for such companies 
to duplicate such a signal on their own. 72 The power of contract goes only so far if enforce-
ment mechanisms are dubious. 
Critically, the mechanism for the precommitment signal was not a corporate governance-
style ban on such transactions, which might have been unworkable for companies in coun-
tries where cross shareholdings are common. Instead, the tool of choice was disclosure 
requirements under exacting US standards, backed by the threat of SEC scrutiny. The US 
exchanges' computerized surveillance systems also promised real teeth for enforcing in-
sider trading rules and other prohibitions against market manipulation. Other coun-
tries have followed the US lead in prohibiting insider trading, but enforcement of those 
71 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., "Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance", 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 (2002). 
72 Edward Rock, "Securities Regulation as a Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of 
Mandatory Disclosure~ 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 675 (2002); see Michael Spence, job Market Signaling", 87 
Q. J. Econ. 355 (1973) ( outlining economic theory of signaling). 
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prohibitions pales in comparison to the SEC's vendetta against the abuse. Of equal signifi-
cance for companies listing in the United States, misstatements about a company's fortunes 
would be subject to the sting of SEC enforcement, generally regarded as a step above other 
jurisdictions, both in the probability and size of sanctions. 73 
In response to lobbying by the exchanges, the SEC encouraged foreign companies to list in 
the US by relaxing a number of potentially expensive requirements for listing.74 The SEC did 
not, however, go so far as to allow foreign companies to merely comply with the disclosure 
requirements of their home jurisdictions (a "mutual recognition" regime). From the SEC's 
perspective, US disclosure standards were superior; they could be tinkered with around 
the edges, but wholesale waiver was not an option. Although the SEC was anxious to bring 
foreign companies to US exchanges, it recognized that it bore a "significant political risk" 
from financial scandals involving foreign firms if American retail investors incurred sub-
stantial losses.75 Moreover, the SEC did not exempt foreign companies from the anti-fraud 
rules, with their potential for both SEC enforcement, but also, the risk of private litigation, 
unheard of in other jurisdictions until very recently. Companies willing to face this risk by 
listing in the United States sent a strong signal of honesty and integrity. 
The twin burdens of SEC disclosure requirements and exposure to securities class actions 
made listing in the United States a costly proposition for foreign companies, notwithstanding 
the SEC's efforts at accommodation. The fact that a significant number of companies were 
willing to pay this price allowed the SEC to tell a happy story of a race to the top in the com-
petition for international listings. The best companies-world-class companies-sought 
to list in the United States because it had the best regulation, the story went. Evidence of a 
listing premium for companies selling shares in the United States strongly supported the 
SEC's account.76 
3.3 The US Loses its Lead 
Toe cheery equilibrium between corporate governance and listing in the US has since proved 
to be fragile. The flow of foreign companies coming to the US stopped, and more worryingly, 
73 John C. Coffee, Jr., "Law and the Market: The Impact ofEnforcement': 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 238 n.17 
(2007) (summarizing LSEs treatment of foreign issuers). The probability of SEC enforcement against 
foreign issuers cross-listing in the U.S. was probably overstated. See Jordan Siegel, "Can foreign firms 
bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws?': 75 J. Fin. Econ. 319,342 (2005) (finding that 
the SEC averaged two enforcement actions per year against cross-listed firms). 
74 Most notably, the agency: (1) allowed foreign issuers to reconcile their accounts with U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles, rather than requiring a new set of financial statements prepared in 
accordance with US standards (see SEC Form F-1); (2) relaxed certain reporting requirements (17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-13(b)(2) (2009) (exempting foreign issuers from quarterly reporting requirements); Id.§ 
243.101(b) (exempting foreign issuers from Regulation FD's equal access to disclosure requirements); and 
(3) exempted foreign companies from the short-swing insider trading rule of Section 16 of the Exchange 
Act and the proxy requirements (17 C.F.R. § 240.3ai2-3). 
75 Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, "A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New 
International Framework': 48 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 31, 49 (2007). 
76 See Craig Doidge et al, "Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?': 71 J. Fin. Econ. 
205(2004). 
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reversed. After the SEC relaxed standards for foreign companies wanting to delist,77 a flood 
of companies headed for the doors. 78 
What derailed the US-led race to the top? The answer is politics, and more particularly, 
Congress. The dividing line between securities law and corporate governance drawn by 
the Supreme Court limits the SEC and the lower courts, but it does not constrain Congress. 
Nonetheless, for nearly fifty years after PUHCA had begun to dwindle, Congress generally 
respected that line. The securities laws were about disclosure. 
The major exception to the disclosure focus of the securities laws was the enactment of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977- The FCPA is a response to Watergate-era 
scandals involving the bribery of foreign officials by US companies, which came under the 
SEC's purview because companies were not recording the bribes and slush funds in their 
accounts (Surprise!). The FCPA includes a variety of books and records provisions intended 
to improve the accuracy of corporate disclosures, so some of its provisions are squarely 
within the bailiwick of the SEC. The FCPA, however, also includes a substantive provision 
outlawing payments by US companies to foreign officials, which can be enforced civilly by 
the SEC and criminally by the Justice Department The provision sits oddly amidst the dis-
closure-oriented provisions of the securities laws, but its practical import has been limited 
until recent efforts to increase enforcement. Moreover, although it does contain a substan-
tive provision that limits the conduct of corporations, it is not limited to public corporations, 
the traditional concern of the securities laws, but rather, US corporations generally. More 
importantly, the prohibition is outward directed. The law prohibits bribing foreign gov-
ernment officials. It says nothing about bribing company officers, which would be a classic 
corporate governance problem. Thus, the FCPA departs from the disclosure focus of the se-
curities laws, but not in a direction that one could fairly criticize as an incursion into the 
state's domain of corporate governance. 
More recently, however, Congress has made substantial inroads into corporate govern-
ance through amendments to the securities laws, blurring the line separating the two. Those 
forays by Congress into corporate governance correspond with the demise of the US as a 
listing destination. The first salvo of incursions into the field of corporate governance came 
with the Sarbanes-O.xley Act fueled by accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom.79 
Collecting a hodge-podge of reforms, Congress (1) took over the regulation of accounting 
firms from the private sector;80 (z) imposed expensive internal controls and certification 
requirements;81 and (3) adopted an array of new sanctions.82 The most expensive of these 
requirements were standards relating to internal accounting controls, requiring both review 
and certifications of those controls by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer. 83 
77 Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section 12,(g) 
and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15( d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-55540, 90 SEC Docket 860 (Mar. 27, 2007). 
78 Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Summary of Competitiveness Measures (2009) (noting that 
more than 12% of foreign :firms listed on the NYSE delisted during the first 10 months of 2007); see also 
Craig Doidge et al., "Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?~ 65 J, Fin.1507 (2010) (finding 
that departing firms had lower growth prospects and capital requirements). 
79 Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and29 U.S.C.). 
80 Sarbanes-Oxley Act§§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219. 81 Id.§ 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241. 
82 E.g., id.§ 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350. 83 Id.§ 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a). 
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Foreign company executives proved less than enthusiastic about the spotlight afforded by 
those certifications, perhaps helping to speed the exodus that followed. 
Not surprisingly, Congress also sought to improve corporate governance relating to the 
auditing function. Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that the retention, compensation, and over-
sight of the company's external auditor must be entrusted to an audit committee of the board 
of directors. The auditors must report to the audit committee "critical accounting policies 
and practices~ The audit committee is also charged with establishing procedures for dealing 
with complaints relating to auditing and internal controls. These provisions are intended to 
set up audit committees as an independent power center within the governance structure of 
public corporations. 
That independence is bolstered by additional mandates relating to the audit committee's 
composition. Audit committees must be made up exclusively of independent directors, 
meaning that the only compensation the director can receive from the company is the 
director's fee-no consulting or other employment arrangements are permitted.84 The SEC 
has bolstered this independence requirement by requiring companies to disclose whether 
any member of the audit committee qualifies as a "financial expert;' which requires either ex-
perience as an accountant or an accounting officer, or experience supervising an accounting 
officer or overseeing public accountants. 85 Listing requirements for the NYSE and Nasdaq 
now require financial literacy for all audit committee members. 
These minor incursions into corporate governance in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act coincided 
with the exodus of foreign companies from US exchanges described above. Far from being 
chastened by that trend, Congress demonstrated even less restraint when it came to "do 
something" in response to the next financial crisis. This time, with the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
corporate governance mandates have no connection whatsoever to liquidity. 86 For example, 
the Dodd-Frank requires that companies disclose whether the same person holds both the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board positions, and explain why the position is combined or 
not. 87 This is a pure corporate governance provision, styled as a disclosure mandate, but with 
no possible connection to liquidity. It simply uses disclosure to put a thumb on the scale to-
ward Congress's view of best corporate governance practices. 
Other mandates are more explicitly driven by a political agenda. Most blatant is Dodd-
Frank's mandate relating to conflict minerals. Concerned about violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo relating to a variety of resource extraction industries, Congress decided 
to use its leverage over corporate disclosure policies to deal with the problem. 88 The SEC 
adopted a new disclosure form, Form SD, requiring companies to disclose payments in ex-
cess of $100,000 made to governments for the purpose of commercial development of nat-
ural resources. 89 The target was armed groups that were profiting from extortion of mining 
operations. The teeth of the rule were provided by the requirement that firms investigate and 
disclose if their products used any "conflict minerals." The expense of the investigation was 
calculated to be enormous: the SEC estimated that the total costs of the final rule would be 
84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(m), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2006). 
85 Regulation S-K, Item 309. 
86 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. m-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(relevant parts codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p ), 78m) (2010)). 
87 Section 972, Dodd-Frank Act. 88 Section 1504, Dodd-Frank Act. 
89 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,277-278 (Sept.12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400). 
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$3 billion to $4 billion initially, and $207 million to $609 million annually thereafter.90 The 
benefits of the rule? Hard to calculate, according to the SEC, because it was hard to quantify 
peace and stability in the Congo.91 It is not hard to guess, however, the benefit to investors 
from these disclosures, which are presumably zero. 
Somewhat more closely tied to corporate governance are Dodd-Frank's mandates relating 
to executive pay, an issue with apparently evergreen populist appeal. The political agenda is 
quite clear in Dodd-Frank's requirement that companies disclose the ratio of their CEO's pay 
to that of their median employee.92 On the governance side, the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
the SEC to direct, by rule, the securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of any equity se-
curities of public companies unless the compensation committees of the public companies' 
boards are made up exclusively of independent directors.93 The independence require-
ment for the board compensation committee parallels the independence requirement for 
the board audit committee. Moreover, Dodd-Frank imposes a variety of responsibilities on 
compensation committees, such as the hiring and supervision of compensation consultants. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also enhances shareholder power over executive compensation. 
Public companies are now required to conduct an advisory vote of shareholders on the pay 
packages of top executives at least once every three years. 94 "Golden parachute" payments 
made to executives displaced in connection with mergers and acquisitions also require 
an advisory vote of shareholders. In connection with these advisory votes, the SEC has 
enhanced the disclosure requirements for these executives in the Compensation Discussion 
and Analysis section of the proxy statement. That disclosure now must also address whether 
(and if so, how) the company has considered the results of the most recent say-on-pay vote 
in determining compensation policies and decisions. Shareholders are not allowed to dictate 
the pay packages of senior executives, but the new regime attempts to maximize the leverage 
implicit in embarrassment.95 
The Dodd-Frank Act also attempted to shift power to shareholders by ensuring access 
to the company's proxy. Historically, outside insurgents could launch a full-blown contest 
with their own proxy statement to elect a competing slate to a company's board of directors, 
but such contests are costly and correspondingly rare. The Dodd-Frank Act authorized the 
SEC to allow shareholders to nominate candidates for director directly on the company's 
proxy without going to the trouble and expense of a proxy contest using a separate proxy 
statement.96 The SEC attempted to implement proxy access through Rule 14a-11. Rule 14a-11 
90 Id. at 56,334 91 Id. at 56,350. 92 Section 953, Dodd-Frank Act. 
93 Section 952, Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC has implemented this requirement through Exchange Act 
Rule10C-1. 
94 Exchange Act§ 14,A; Rule 14a-21(a). 
95 The initial results of the say on pay votes that occurred immediately after the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act showed that shareholders were approving the compensation packages for 98.5% of 
the companies. Even though almost all say on pay votes to date have resulted in approval of executive 
compensation, the mere prospect of a say on pay vote may change the amount and form ( e.g., base pay 
versus incentive pay) of pay presented to shareholders for a vote. A number of companies, moreover, 
were able to secure approval only after modifying their compensation packages. The relative lack of 
impact for this provision is consistent with experience in the UK, which provided the model for the 
provision. See Jeffrey N, Gordon," 'Say on Pay': Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case 
for Shareholder Opt-in~ 46 Harv. J. Legis. 323 (2009). 
96 Section 971, Dodd-Frank Act. 
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allowed shareholders (and shareholder groups) who have held at least 3% of the company's 
stock for three years the right to nominate directors and have those nominees included in 
the company's proxy statement and ballot. The rule did not provide an alternative to a full-
fledged proxy contest, however, as shareholders were limited to nominating candidates for 
only 25% of the board. The SEC adopted Rule 14a-11 over the heated objections of corpor-
ate management. Groups representing management then challenged the rule in court, and 
in mid-2011, the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11.97 The SEC has not been stripped of its 
rulemaking authority, however, so it is a matter of time before it returns to the topic. 
The net effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts has been to erode the trad-
itional line between securities law and corporate governance in the US. The key word is 
"traditional"; there has not been any legal barrier to Congress taking over the governance 
of public corporations since the 1940s. Perhaps what is surprising is that the incursion took 
as long as it did. Perhaps less surprising is that Congress now appears completely indifferent 
to the status of the US as a listing destination. Competitiveness in financial services, once a 
hot topic, was swept aside as a concern in the rush to respond to accounting scandals and a 
financial crisis. Also swept aside has been the notion that there "should" be a dividing line 
between corporate governance and securities law. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The US maintained the dividing line between corporate law and securities law for nearly 
70 years after the adoption of the federal securities law. Much of the work done protecting 
that line was done by the Supreme Court, which affirmed the role of the states in corpor-
ate law as a matter of tradition, rather than enforcing strict constitutional limits. The last 
15 years, however, have seen that line beginning to erode as Congress has amended the fed-
eral securities laws to include corporate governance mandates with little or no connection 
to liquidity, the traditional focus of securities regulation. Those intrusions were responses 
to accounting scandals and financial crisis. Congress's interventions in corporate gov-
ernance have coincided with a decline in the competitiveness of the US in the market for 
listings, but Congress has not responded to that decline, which is not salient enough to rise 
to "crisis" level. 
To be sure, the US's decline as a listing destination cannot wholly be ascribed to Congress. 
Another factor fueling the trend has been the continuing development of trading technology 
and market liquidity that once promised to fuel the US's race to the top. The comparative 
advantage of US exchanges has now been substantially eroded. Stock exchanges around 
the world now offer similar speed in executing orders. Increasingly, securities trading has 
been reduced to the status of commodity. Toe best trading systems are no longer the mo-
nopoly of the exchanges, which are hemorrhaging market share to proprietary trading sys-
tems and dark pools.98 Commodification of trading technology-along with greater access 
97 Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 R3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
98 See generally Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, "For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange 'Ii:ading Floors and the Growth ofECNs': 33 J. Corp. L. 865 (2008). 
1082 ADAM C. PRITCHARD 
to information about companies in other jurisdictions-has greatly reduced the liquidity 
advantages historically enjoyed by the NYSE, which has cut fees in response. 99 
Of equal importance to the question of liquidity is the fact that companies no longer 
need to bring their shares in physical proximity to investors. Institutional investors can 
access virtually any market in the world.100 As a result, ADRs have fallen out of favor, as 
investors invest directly abroad.101 Moreover, Rule 144A allows issuers to access capital in the 
United States without a US listing.102 Why should a company pay for an expensive listing in 
New York if a listing in their home country allows them easy access to capital from around 
the world? For regulators, this means that listing requirements are likely to offer little lev-
erage as a regulatory tool. Draconian mandates, unrelated to liquidity, will be met by an exo-
dus to jurisdictions with more lenient standards. 
Another threat to the use of listing standards as a means of promoting corporate govern-
ance reform is private equity. The rise of private equity has demonstrated that firms in many 
industries with diverse business models can thrive without access to public capital markets. 
For these firms, corporate governance is purely a matter of contract. Firms that value liq-
uidity are likely to tolerate disclosure mandates relating to liquidity, but if securities law and 
disclosure mandates drift toward corporate governance imperatives unrelated to liquidity, 
firms are likely to exit the public markets. If Congress continues to intervene in corporate 
governance, the number of US public companies could dwindle. 
The US experience thus presents a cautionary tale for reformers contemplating the use 
of securities law to upgrade corporate governance standards. Countries may vary, however, 
in the relationship that corporate governance has to liquidity. Lessons from the US experi-
ence may have limited relevance for other parts of the world: US corporate governance is 
pretty good, so marginal improvements in any particular aspect may have limited real-world 
effects.103 
The situation may be quite different in developing economies, where the baseline may not 
be as high. For example, there is evidence that degree of board independence and splitting 
the roles of Chair and CEO may correlate with greater liquidity post-lPO for Chinese 
firms.104 These correlations may be explained by the prevalence of controlling shareholders 
in Chinese firms, and perhaps, relatively weak legal enforcement. The Chinese experience 
may be singular in another way-many governance reforms in that country are initiated 
by the country's securities regulator, which may be forced to act due to the absence of any 
99 Jacob Bunge, NYSE Adjusts Charges In Bid to Draw Traders, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at Cs 
("Incumbent stock exchanges are grappling with lower year-on-year trading volumes and tougher 
competition from newer entrants like BATS Exchange and Direct Edge in the U.S., and a host of trading 
platforms in Europe"). 
100 Chris Brummer, "Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws~ 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1435, 1459-66 (2008). 
101 See Eric J. Pan, "Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us" 8-11 (Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law, Working Paper No. 176, 2006). 
102 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009). On the importance of Rule 144A in undermining the incentive of 
foreign issuers to list in the U.S., see Pan, supra note 101, at 7. See also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., "The Birth 
ofRule 144A Equity Offerings~ 56 UCLA L. Rev. 409 (2008). 
103 Jeffrey N. Gordon, "The Rise oflndependent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices", 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1469 (2007). 
104 Junheng Zhu et al., "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and IPO Post-Listing Liquidity'; 
Queensland University Working Paper, 2014. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND SECURITIES LAW 1083 
alternative actor.105 In countries such as China, where the rule of law is not as well estab-
lished, the move toward mandating better corporate governance standards may substantially 
improve the operation of the capital markets, even absent an obvious connection between 
corporate governance and liquidity. 
Another consideration for corporate governance reformers is that familiarity may breed 
liquidity. Standardization may be an important feature in corporate governance if informa-
tion is incomplete and market participants are boundedly rational. If investors understand 
a common governance structure, making it mandatory may allow for easier comparability, 
which may be particularly important to firms seeking overseas investment. From the US 
perspective, the prevalence of Delaware as the choice of incorporation for most public 
companies in the US is sometimes attributed to investors' preference for Delaware incorpo-
ration-which may be based on Delaware's prevalence. Institutional investors are familiar 
with Delaware corporate law; they know what they are getting. Sometimes having a con-
sistent standard is more important than having the best standard, or the standard best tai-
lored for a particular firm. 
On the other hand, a standardization strategy may have long-term consequences. Once 
standards become prevalent, if not universal, in the marketplace, politicians may be tempted 
to mandate the prevalent standard as "best practice:' Once mandated, however, there may 
be costs imposed on firms that deviated from the norm for idiosyncratic, but perhaps le-
gitimate reasons. In addition, the mandate may stifle experimentation and adaption to new 
conditions. Assessing the benefits and costs fl.owing from standardization is a daunting em-
pirical task, particularly because the incidence of those benefits and costs is unlikely to be 
evenly distributed 
This chapter has focused on the connections between corporate governance, capital 
markets, and securities law. Looking at how the relation among these has developed over 
time in the US, it has identified liquidity as the key variable connecting the three. Corporate 
governance mandates with a clear connection to liquidity are more likely to be accepted and 
to last. When policy makers move beyond the promotion of liquidity, firms may choose to 
exit to avoid costly mandates. 
105 Nicholas Calcina Howson, "'Quack Corporate Governance' as Traditional Chinese Medicine-the 
Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China's Corporate Law and a State Regulator's Battle Against 
Party State Political Economic Power': Working Paper, University of Michigan, 2014. 
